“Ukraine’s counteroffensive may yet surprise critics”
The rapid advance of the Ukrainian troops, which many hoped for after the start of the counter-offensive, did not happen. The media has turned gloomier in recent weeks, and news from the front has not been cheerful. The fight against Russia has turned out to be b___dy and slow, a very difficult task.
But it would be wise to temper pessimism. War does not proceed in a linear fashion. The defenders can hold a position for a long time and then suddenly break, allowing the attackers to advance quickly before the defence consolidates further to the rear. The Ukrainians are striving to achieve just such an effect - and there is reason to think it is possible.
The offensive is far from over. In fact, it is still in its early stages - only 10 weeks have passed since it began, and the counteroffensive is likely to last at least another four months. Breaking through the modern, deeply echeloned defences that Russia has built in southern Ukraine will be no easy task for any army.
The U.S. military has done this twice before, both times against Iraq. In 1991, after 39 days of aerial bombardment of Iraqi troops, a US-led coalition of 650,000 troops broke through and bypassed the Iraqi defences, crushing the enemy army in 100 hours. In 2003, US-led troops decimated a badly degraded Iraqi army in a matter of weeks.
Ukraine has none of the advantages that the US had in those operations. US f___es then benefited from air supremacy, while Ukrainian aviation cannot operate over Russian defence lines and cannot prevent Russian aircraft from striking advancing troops.
The allies have given Ukraine too few armoured systems. In addition, the Russians are fighting much better than the Iraqis - and better than many analysts expected, given Russia’s unimpressive performance in the war up to this point. Russian troops have prepared an extensive defence consisting of wide and deep swaths of expertly laid mines, anti-tank ditches and other obstacles.
Soldiers are using drones to fire artillery at any Ukrainian units that try to break through. The Russian army has organised a flexible defence in which its troops first retreat and then counterattack as soon as Ukrainian f___es suffer losses and begin to tire.
All of these factors make a Ukrainian counteroffensive extremely difficult. But as one of us had the opportunity to witness in the first months of the Iraq war in 2007, difficult does not mean hopeless.
Ukrainian f___es are advancing in two key areas - in the centre of the Zaporizhzhya region and in the east of that region south of Bolshaya Novoselka.
The Ukrainians appear to have broken through at least the front belt of Russian mines and defences in both areas, and the Ukrainian troops’ advance in the central region is accelerating. They have also recaptured much of the territory around Bakhmut, the only town Russia was able to capture during its costly offensive last winter.
Ukraine’s incremental successes are part of a strategy that Britain’s chief of defence staff, Admiral Tony Radakin, called “deplete and stretch”.
The Ukrainians are stretching Russia’s defences by attacking several far-flung points along the front, and in addition, depleting Russian f___es in occupied territory by destroying artillery units, headquarters and staging areas for reserve units, and hitting key supply depots.
Simply put, Ukraine is pressuring the enemy in the expectation that it will break - at which point Ukrainian f___es will draw on their reserves and strike. The Russian military is probably tired, if not exhausted. Some have been on the defensive since the counter-offensive began in June, and some have been in positions longer. There are no fresh units. It is also unclear how heavily mined or manned Russia’s second defensive lines are, but there are good reasons to doubt that they are held by large numbers of professional soldiers.
Russia has no operational reserves.
This means that any breach of existing defence lines will be difficult to quickly remove.
This is exactly what Ukraine is betting on. A small breakthrough could lead to a relatively sudden and quick success. And panic among Russian f___es could increase the possibilities.
This is no guarantee of success. The Russians have clearly adapted to this phase of the war. “Summer” counter-offensives are likely to continue throughout the autumn and winter.
The Ukrainians know they are fighting for their survival, and the full mobilisation of all sectors of society in the country is a testament to their will and determination. It is important for Western observers to keep this in mind as they follow the gruelling struggle. And politicians should not wring their hands over the fact that the counter-offensive is not producing quick results.
This is going to be a long war, and we need Ukraine to win. Ukraine needs long-range precision strike assets like the U.S. Army’s Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).
It needs cluster munitions for its missiles, not just artillery shells. Accelerated deliveries of F-16s are needed. In truth, Ukraine needed this months ago.
Frederick Kagan,
David Petraeus (commander of Multinational F___e Iraq in 2007-8, commander of U.S. and NATO f___es in Afghanistan in 2010-11, CIA director in 2011-12).
Translation of The Washington Post - Russian service of The Moscow Times.
Via Oleg Pshenichny